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Abstract
Great progress has been made recently in verifying the
correctness of router forwarding tables [17, 19, 20, 26].
However, these approaches do not work for networks con-
taining middleboxes such as caches and firewalls whose
forwarding behavior depends on previously observed traf-
fic. We explore how to verify isolation properties in net-
works that include such “dynamic datapath” elements us-
ing model checking. Our work leverages recent advances
in SMT solvers, and the main challenge lies in scaling
the approach to handle large and complicated networks.
While the straightforward application of model checking
to this problem can only handle very small networks (if
at all), our approach can verify simple realistic invari-
ants on networks containing 30,000 middleboxes in a few
minutes.
1 Introduction
Perhaps lulled into a sense of complacency because of
the Internet’s best-effort delivery model, which makes
no explicit promises about network behavior, networking
has long relied on ad hoc configuration and a “we’ll fix
it when it breaks” operational attitude. However, as net-
working matures as a field, and institutions increasingly
rely on networks to provide isolation and other behavioral
guarantees, there is growing interest in developing rigor-
ous verification tools that can ensure the correctness of
network configurations. The first works along this line –
Anteater [26], Veriflow [20], and HSA [17, 19] – provide
highly efficient (in fact, near real-time) checking of con-
nectivity (and, conversely isolation) properties and detect
anomalies such as loops and black holes. This represents
a massive and invaluable step forward for networking.
These verification tools assume that the forwarding
behavior is set by the control plane, and not altered by
the traffic, so verification needs to be invoked only when
the control plane alters routing entries. This approach is
entirely sufficient for networks of routers, which is obvi-
ously an important use case. However, modern networks
contain more than routers.
Most networks contain switches whose learning be-
havior renders their forwarding behavior dependent on
the traffic they have seen. More generally, most networks
also contain middleboxes, and middleboxes often have
forwarding behavior that depends on the observed traffic.
For instance, content caches forward differently based on
whether the desired content is found locally, and firewalls
often rely on outbound “hole-punching” to allow flows
to enter an enterprise network. We will refer to network
elements whose forwarding behavior can be affected by
datapath activity as having a “dynamic datapath”, and
additional examples of such elements include WAN opti-
mizers, deep-packet-inspection boxes, and load balancers.
While classical networking often treats middleboxes as
an unfortunate and rare occurrence in networks, the reality
is that middleboxes have become the most viable way of
incrementally deploying new network functionality. Op-
erators have turned to middleboxes to such a great extent
that a recent study [33] of over one hundred enterprise
networks revealed that these networks are roughly equally
divided between routers, switches and middleboxes. Thus,
roughly two-thirds of the forwarding boxes in enterprise
networks have dynamic datapaths, and do not abide by
the models used in the recently developed network ver-
ification tools. Moreover, the rise of Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) [9], in which physical middleboxes
are replaced by their virtual counterparts, makes it eas-
ier to deploy additional middleboxes without changes in
the physical infrastructure. Thus, we must reconcile our-
selves to the fact that many networks will have substantial
numbers of elements with dynamic datapaths.
Not only are middleboxes prevalent, but they are often
responsible for network problems. In December 2012 a
misconfiguration in Google’s load balancers resulted in
a several minute outage for GMail and other Google Ser-
vices [3]. A recent two year study [29] of a provider found
that middleboxes played a role in 43% of their failure in-
cidents, and between 4 and 15% of these failures were the
result of middlebox misconfiguration. Thus, middleboxes
are a significant cause of network problems, and we have
no verification tools that can help.
The goal of this paper is to extend the notion of verifica-
tion to networks containing dynamic datapaths, so that we
can check if invariants such as connectivity or isolation
hold. Our basic approach is simple: we treat each dynamic
datapath element as a “subroutine” and the network as
a whole as a program. The routers and switches provide
the glue that connects these procedures. The specified
invariants imply constraints on dataflow within this pro-
gram. We use symbolic model checking to determine if
the specified invariants hold. As described so far, this is a
straightforward application of standard programming lan-
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guage techniques to networks. However, naı¨vely applied,
this approach would fail to scale: middlebox code is ex-
tremely complicated, and checking even simple invariants
in modest-sized networks would be intractable. Thus, the
bulk of this paper, and the focus of our contribution, is
about how to scale this approach to large networks.
Our efforts to scale to large networks involves four
different aspects:
1. Limited invariants: Rather than deal with an arbi-
trary set of invariants, we focus on two specific categories.
The first category of invariants involve the packet process-
ing requirements (as defined by the operator) for various
classes of packets; these requirements are specified as a
set of middleboxes (more generally as a DAG of middle-
boxes) packets should flow through; we call these pipeline
invariants. The second category of invariants concern the
overall behavior of the network, and here we only con-
sider invariants that address reachability and isolation
between hosts (at the packet and content level). These
pipeline and isolation invariants play distinct roles in the
network, and their verification is done quite differently.
2. Simple high-level middlebox models: A standard
approach to model checking middleboxes would use their
full implementation. This is infeasible for two reasons: (i)
we do not have access to middlebox code, and (ii) model
checking even one such box for even the simplest invari-
ants would be difficult. Instead, we consider simplified
models (as we discuss later, these reduced models capture
only the dependence on the packet header). These models
can typically be derived from a general description of the
middlebox’s behavior and can be represented as a state
machine that can be easily analyzed.
3. Modularized network models: Networks contain
elements with static datapaths and dynamic datapaths.
Rather than consider them all within the model checking
framework, which would overburden a system already
having trouble scaling, we treat the two separately: it
is the job of the static datapath elements to satisfy the
pipeline invariants (that is, to carry packets through the
appropriate set of middleboxes), which we can analyze
using existing verification tools; and it is the job of the
processing pipeline to enforce isolation invariants, and
that is where we focus our attention. Thus, our resulting
system is a hybrid of current static-datapath verification
tools and our newly-proposed tool for dynamic datapaths.
4. Special class of network enforcement: Certain net-
work designs allow invariants to be verified by checking
only a portion of the network. We show that these de-
signs carry no additional overhead but allow operators to
quickly verify their policies; the use of such designs is
key to scaling out verification to large networks.
These four steps lead us to a system that can verify
realistic invariants on very large networks; as an example,
we can verify a set of isolation invariants on a network
containing 30,000 middleboxes in 2 to 5 minutes.
In the next section, we discuss all four of these steps
more formally, and then in §3 we provide an overview
of the system we built that incorporates these ideas. We
provide a theoretical analysis of the tractability of our
approach in §4 and provide performance numbers from
our operational system in §5. We conclude in §6 and §7
with a discussion of related work and a brief summary.
2 Background
We begin by defining the verification problem addressed
by this paper and describing the simplification steps that
allow our system (described in §3) to scale. First we
present the specific invariants we analyze (§2.1). Next
we show that by focusing on these specific invariants and
using some natural restriction on middlebox behaviors
(§2.2) we can greatly simplify automated reasoning and
verification for these middleboxes. Next in §2.3 we show
how multiple middlebox models can be combined so we
can reason about a network and finally (§2.4) we find
some additional conditions that allow us to verify net-
work wide properties by operating on individual pipelines
instead of the entire network.
Note we do not attempt to verify that middlebox imple-
mentations are correct (i.e., obey the given model). How-
ever, we do discuss how one can enforce that middleboxes
obey the abstract model by simulating the state-machine
that models its intended behavior. But this enforcement
is merely a small aspect of our work: our main focus
in this paper is on verifying, using an SMT solver [7],
that the combination of several middleboxes enforces (i.e.,
implements) a given invariant.
2.1 Desired Network Properties
We focus on three classes of invariants that address some
of the core correctness issues plaguing networks:
Packet-level reachability and isolation between end-
hosts. This is the most straightforward network in-
variant: can two hosts exchange packets? In most
cases we want to ensure that two hosts can exchange
packets, but there are scenarios where isolation is
crucial and here we want to ensure that the hosts
cannot exchange packets.
Packet-level reachability and isolation between end-
hosts, with learning. This is a variation of the above
invariant, where there is an asymmetry in that, for
example, we might want to allow host a to initiate
contact with host b, but not allow host b to initiate
contact with host a. But once contact is properly
initiated, we want two-way reachability.
Content-level reachability and isolation between
endhosts. One of the most interesting consequences
of middleboxes is that the content of a host can be
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leaked to another host (as through a cache) even
when these hosts cannot exchange packets. There-
fore we also consider prevention of content exchange
between two hosts (and this condition need not be
symmetric; content from host a might be allowed to
reach host b, but not vice versa).
This is a very restricted class of invariants, but they
can be used to address slightly more general questions,
such as Traversal (do packets going between source A
and destination B always go through a particular element
or link?) and Preconditions (are packet bodies modified
before being processed by a particular middlebox?). How-
ever, our current approach is not able to address invariants
that address issues such as quantity (how many packets
can be sent between hosts?), performance (do packets
travel over uncongested links?), or content (are packets
containing a certain string delivered?), since these would
require detailed consideration of each packet in the net-
work, not just understanding broad classes of network
behavior. Further, our choice of invariants imply condi-
tions on particular source-destination pairs (requiring for
instance that source a not communicate with source b)
rather than applying to more general network-wide prop-
erties (e.g., all source-destination pairs in a network use
disjoint paths).
2.2 Middlebox Behavior
Because we are concerned with a limited class of invari-
ants, we need not consider fully detailed models of mid-
dleboxes. In fact, our invariants can be checked using
relatively simple models that summarize what possible
set of behaviors the middlebox might take for packets
with a given header. We make this more precise below.
We start with a few basic definitions: P is the space
of packets, P∗ is the space of all packet sequences, H is
the space of packet headers, and MB is the set of mid-
dleboxes (including learning switches). In this paper we
assume middleboxes have a single output port.1 Further
middleboxes can depend on the entire packet (including
the payload) and on the history of packet arrivals2. A
middlebox m can be more formally represented as:
m : P×P∗→ A⊆ P
where A represents the middlebox’s action on the packet:
given a packet and a packet history, a middlebox can
produce zero or more packets (which is why the range of
the m is not a single packet but a set of packets).
However, given our limited set of invariants, as we
show later (through the success of our approach), we can
make do with a reduced model that does not require de-
tailed knowledge of the middleboxes decision process.
This reduced model considers only how the behavior de-
1A multiport middlebox can be modeled as a single-port middlebox
followed by a multiport router.
2Middlebox state is derived from this history.
pends on the headers using a function rm:
rm : H×H∗→ A⊆ H
The reduced model does not prevent us from considering
middleboxes whose behavior depends on the packet body,
it merely takes the union of all such body-dependent be-
haviors and does not try to model which packet bodies
elicit which behavior. This means that in order to model
a middlebox we need not understand the details of its
implementation, but only the broad outlines of the kinds
of behaviors it supports.3
Note that these reduced models of middleboxes are
often quite simple. Firewalls either forward a packet un-
changed (if allowed), or block (if disallowed by an ACL),
or forward conditionally if a hole has been punched by a
packet in the opposite direction. Similarly, a cache either
forwards a request or returns a response depending on
whether it has a previously cached copy of the requested
content. Thus, we assume that these reduced forms can
be specified in a limited grammar (described in §3.1) and
are equivalent to finite state machines.
Even with these reduced models, verification requires
analyzing the entire network. However, as we argue later,
this can be avoided due to the fact that many existing
middleboxes (including firewalls) only depend on state
pertaining to a particular flow. We would like to focus
on middleboxes where rm(h,S| f low(h)) = rm(h,S) where
rm is a reduced middlebox function, h ∈ H, S ∈ H∗ and
S| f low(h) ⊆ S is the sequence of headers which belong to
the same flow as h (the definition of flow can be arbitrary,
as long as membership in a flow is a deterministic function
of the header). This would effectively allow us to treat a
given middlebox as several parallel middleboxes, one per
flow. However, it turns out that this simple definition is
overly restrictive, and we need a more general definition
as follows. We say a middlebox is Flow-Parallel (FP) if
and only if:
∀h, S∃S′ ⊇ S| f low(h)s.t.rm(h,S′| f low(h)) = rm(h,S)
What this awkward definition means is that for every
packet history, there is a possible flow history that can
reproduce the same behavior. In short, the middlebox can
never behave in a way that is inconsistent with a possible
history of just that flow; all possible behaviors on a flow
can be exhibited just by looking at the single flow. The
pertinent example here is that an FP cache never returns
content that was in the cache due to some other flow’s
previous request if it wouldn’t have returned content if it
had been requested by that flow.
3However, our formulation includes both the general behavior of a
middlebox and its current configuration; that is, firewalls have generic
behavior, but also specific ACLs that determine which packets they drop.
For simplicity we do not distinguish between the two here.
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2.3 Pipeline Invariants
Along with the isolation invariants described in §2.1, we
also need to check pipeline invariants. A pipeline invariant
takes the form: all incoming packets with headers belong
to some I ⊆ H must have passed through the sequence
of middleboxes mb1,mb2,mb3, ... before being delivered
by the network. Note that these invariants could refer to
physical instances of middleboxes (e.g., packets must tra-
verse this particular middlebox) or a class of middleboxes
(e.g., packets must traverse a firewall). We assume that all
packet headers belonging to the same flow are processed
by the same pipeline (which can be enforced, as discussed
below).
As we discuss in Section 3, we can check these invari-
ants using slight extensions to current verification tools.
This is possible by breaking the network into the static-
datapath components and the dynamic-datapath compo-
nents. A packet entering a static-datapath portion of the
network (either from a middlebox, or from an ingress
port) emerges at an output port in O or at a middlebox in
MB with perhaps a modified header. This behavior is de-
scribed by a “transfer function” T which can be efficiently
computed by current verification tools, and when iterated
will produce the pipeline that results from a given input
packet. As we discuss later, this is sufficient to scalably
verify the pipeline invariants in large networks.
2.4 Stronger Enforcement Conditions
An operator’s goal is to design their network — including
the network topology, where middleboxes are placed in
the network, and how they are configured — that can
enforce their desired invariants. In this paper we exam-
ine how we can efficiently verify that a particular net-
work achieves this result. It is simple to efficiently verify
pipeline invariants. However, these techniques do not ap-
ply to our other invariants, whose enforcement depends
in more detail on the behavior of middleboxes. For these
invariants we rely on particular forms of pipelines to help
scale verification.
Consider a simple pipeline Π: a sequence of middle-
boxesΠ= {m1,m2,m3, . . . ,mk} (for simplicity, we ignore
the possibility that intervening routers rewrite any packets
and assume they merely forward them).4 This pipeline is
similar to a middlebox: it maps an incoming packet and a
history into one or more outgoing packets. However un-
like a middlebox, the computation for a pipeline depends
not just on the history of packets that traverse the pipeline,
but also on packets that are received and processed by any
4More complicated pipelines can be DAGs, not just a single se-
quence; that is, the pipeline can branch at points depending on the
actions intervening middleboxes and routers. Our tools deals with such
cases, but for simplicity we ignore this possibility in this section.
of the constituent middleboxes. More formally:
Π : H×Sn→ A⊆ H
where Sn is the sequence of all packets sent in the network.
Analyzing such pipelines is expensive since it requires
considering the behavior and possible histories of all the
constituents of a network.
Similar to flow-parallel middleboxes, we say that a
pipeline is “rest-of-network-oblivious” (RONO) if and
only if:
∀h, Sn∃S′ ⊇ Sn| f low(h) s.t. Π(h,S′| f low(h)) =Π(h,Sn)
where S′| f low(h) is the history restricted to the flow defined
by header h as above, and whose packet flow through the
entire pipeline. As noted previously, the isolation invari-
ants we focus on are all stated in terms of pairs of endhosts
(and can thus be naturally extended to a set of flows). It is
now simple to see that given an invariant I involving hosts
a and b, and a set of RONO pipelines Π1 . . .Πn connect-
ing a and b (each applying to a different set of headers), I
holds for the entire network if and only if I holds for all
pipelines Π1 to Πn.
Thus if one can enforce the desired invariants in a net-
work using RONO pipelines, then one need only verify
invariants on the pipeline in isolation. While RONO and
flow-parallelism are closely related, somewhat surpris-
ingly not all compositions of FP middleboxes are RONO.
In §4.2 we derive conditions under which compositions
of FP middleboxes are guaranteed to be RONO. Isolation
invariants can thus be verified quickly by checking that (a)
all middleboxes in the pipelines connecting the endhosts
are flow-parallel, (b) the pipelines themselves are RONO
and (c) the invariant holds on each pipeline. The first
two steps are relatively simple static checks that depend
only on the middlebox model specification and the last
verification step generally scales with the length of the
pipeline and policy size (i.e., the number of invariants)
rather than the size of the network. We evaluate scalability
empirically in §5.
3 System Design
Based on the previous theory, we have implemented a
system to verify invariants of the type described in §2.1 in
a given network. Our system uses Z3 [7], a state-of-the-art
SMT solver, as an oracle that can prove theorems of the
appropriate form. For verification we require two inputs:
(a) middlebox models written in a restricted language
based on Python (§3.1); (b) network topology information
including routing tables, middlebox configurations and
end host metadata. The system converts these inputs to a
suitable form, adds additional assertions (§3.3) describing
the physical behavior of the network, as well as the invari-
ant being checked, and produces the input supplied to Z3.
Given this input, Z3 returns unsat (indicating that the
input assertions can never be satisfied), sat (indicating
that a satisfiable assignment was found) or undefined (in-
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1 def LearningFw ( node , a c l , f l o w s ) :
2 p = r e c v ( node )
3 i f a c l [ p . s r c ( ) , p . d e s t ( ) ] :
4 send ( node , p )
5 f l o w s . s e t ( ( p . s r c ( ) , p . d e s t ( ) ,
p . s r c p o r t ( ) , p . d e s t p o r t ( ) ) ,
True )
6 e l i f f l o w s [ ( p . d e s t ( ) , p . s r c ( ) ,
p . d e s t p o r t ( ) , p . s r c p o r t ( ) ) ] :
7 send ( node , p )
8
9 a c l = ConfigMap ( ( Address , Address ) , Bool )
10 f l o w s = Map ( ( Address , Address , I n t , I n t ) ,
Bool )
11 LearningFw ( f , a c l , f l o w s )
Listing 1: Model for a learning firewall
dicating that the check timed out). The system interprets
this return value to determine if the invariant holds. We
describe each of these steps below.
3.1 Modeling Middleboxes
SMT solvers cannot always prove (or disprove) fully gen-
eral theorems5 and we must limit the complexity of our
input to Z3. We therefore require that middlebox models
used by our system are restricted so that:
1. Models are expressed so they are loop-free and all
received packets are processed in a fixed number of steps.
2. Models only access local state which is naturally
true for existing middleboxes, which are physically dis-
tinct and must use the network to share state.
3. Models are expressed using a limited set of actions:
they can receive packets, check conditions, send packets
and update state.
4. Models must be deterministic for a given packet
and history. For flow-parallel (FP) middleboxes we re-
quire that the modeled behavior be identical for a given
packet and all histories with the same flow-restricted
history, i.e., m(h,S) = m(h,S′) for all S,S′ ∈ H∗ with
S| f low(h) = S′| f low(h) and FP middlebox m. While exist-
ing implementations can be non-deterministic (e.g., NATs
that assign ports in order of flow initiation), these have
equivalent, semantically correct, deterministic versions
(for instance a NAT that uses flow hashing to assign ports)
for which our invariants hold if and only if they also hold
in the non-deterministic case.
Users specify middlebox models (which are general
and can be reused for different networks) using a subset
of Python that allows users to:
• Read and set values from instances of Map objects,
which behave like dictionaries or hash maps.
• Read values from ConfigMap objects, which hold
configuration information.
• Call uninterpreted functions with finite codomains
5First-order logic is undecidable in general and we must restrict
ourselves to formulas in a decidable fragment. See §4.1 for details.
1 d p i = F u n c t i o n ( [ Body ] , Bool )
2 def DPIFw ( node ) :
3 p = r e c v ( node )
4 i f d p i ( p . body ( ) ) :
5 send ( node , p )
Listing 2: Model for a DPI middlebox
(i.e., returns one of a finite set of values).6
• Use conditionals if, else, elif.
• Construct a packet and set packet field values.
• Call the recv function to receive a packet.
• Call the send function to send a packet.
As an example, consider the model for a learning fire-
wall shown in Listing 1. The firewall can forward received
packets either because this is explicitly allowed by the
firewall policy (line 3, where we check to see if the packet
is allowed by the list of ACLs) or because a previously
allowed packet established flow state (in line 5, we mod-
ify the Map flows to record what packets have been seen,
which we then check in line 6). The model itself is spec-
ified by the function definition (lines 1–7). Lines 9–11
show how this model can be initialized for a node f .
Listing 2 shows an example where an uninterpreted
function dpi (defined on line 1) is used. dpi accepts a
packet body and returns a boolean and hence has a finite
codomain of size 2 (i.e., it returns true or false).
The system translates these models into an equivalent
set of formulas in temporal logic that we supply to Z3.
Figure 1 shows the formulas for an instance ( f ) of the
learning firewall.
The translation works by performing a depth first traver-
sal of the abstract syntax tree (AST) to find all calls to
send or set (henceforth referred to as “actions”) and
the path leading to these calls. The path is converted to
an appropriate path constraint and we output assertions
of the form action =⇒ path constraint, essentially re-
quiring that if an action (e.g., a packet is forwarded) is
executed then all conditions leading up to it must hold.
Our model description could produce several equivalent
sets of formulas. Later in §4 we use one such equivalent
formulas to prove that our formulation is decidable. We
chose this particular form of formulas based on how long
it took Z3 to produce a proof for these formulas.
3.2 Network Transfer Functions
We also place a few restrictions on the topology and for-
warding state for networks we verify, in particular we
require that the networks under consideration be:
1. Forwarding loop free, this is required to ensure that
the formulas supplied to the SMT solver are decidable.
2. Have no black holes (i.e., routers and switch for-
warding tables be setup such that packets are always for-
warded to their destination).
6In our current implementation we do not check that uninterpreted
functions have finite codomains.
5
send( f ,n, p, t)⇒∃t ′,n′.recv(n′, f , p, t ′)∧ t ′ < t
∧ (acl(s(p),d(p))
∨ (acl(s(p),d(p))
∧ f lows(d(p),s(p),d p(p),sp(p), t ′)))
f lows(s,d,sp,dp, t)⇒
(∃t ′,n, p.recv(n, f , p, t ′)∧ t ′ < t
∧acl(s(p),d(p))∧ s = s(p)
∧d = d(p)∧dp = d p(p)
∧ sp = sp(p))
Figure 1: Formulas generated from Listing 1. The left side of the first
two formulas have a universal quantifier, i.e., each is preceded by ∀n, p, t
etc. f is a symbolic node representing the firewall.
We leverage VeriFlow [20] to both check that the input
topology and forwarding tables meet the previous require-
ments and to produce a forwarding graph that we can then
convert to a set of “composition assertions” that we add to
the theorem provided to Z3. Along with the topology and
forwarding table we also accept configuration for mid-
dleboxes and endhosts. This configuration specifies the
type of the node (which we use to create a new instance
from the appropriate model) and any configuration that
the model might depend on. For end hosts this config-
uration also specifies the set of addresses assigned to a
specific host (we assume that hosts are honest, i.e., they
do not send packet with spoofed addresses, this can be
easily enforced at the first hop).
Once these models are instantiated we query the for-
warding graph to determine the possible pipeline(s) tra-
versed by a packet sent from one end host to another.
We translate these pipelines into composition constraints
of the form send(a,n, p, t) ∧ (d(p) = ipb) ∧ (s(p) =
ipa) =⇒ (n = f ). The previous composition constraint
indicates that packets leaving host a with destination ad-
dress ipb and source address ipa are sent to the firewall
next. We refer to this collection of instantiated middlebox
models and composition constraints as the network model
3.3 Other Assertions
Next we add to the network model some basic axioms
describing the universe in which the network operates.
These axioms (Figure 2) state that:
1. The network has no local loops (i.e., no packets with
the same source and destination address).
2. Any packet received at a node n′ from node n at
time t was sent by n at an earlier time t ′.
3. Time is represented by positive numbers.
3.4 Verification
Finally, we add to the network model one or more vari-
ables (representing packets) and assertions on these vari-
ables (encoding conditions that should or should not hold
send(n,n′, p, t) =⇒ n 6= n′
send(n,n′, p, t) =⇒ s(p) 6= d(p)
recv(n,n′, p, t) =⇒ ∃t ′.send(n,n′, p, t ′)∧ t ′ < t
send(n,n′, p, t) =⇒ t > 0
recv(n,n′, p, t) =⇒ t > 0
Figure 2: Basic network axioms.
if the invariant holds) to generate an input for Z3. Given
this input Z3 either returns a valid assignment for the
variables such that the supplied assertions hold under the
network model (sat) or that no such assignment exists
(unsat). The variables and assertions added for each
invariant are:
• Node Isolation: To check node isolation between
nodes a and b, we add a variable representing a packet
(p) and assertions requiring that the packet was sent by a
and later received by b. If the solver returns unsat no
such packet can exist and the nodes are isolated. Note,
that node reachability is the negation of this and is true
whenever the solver returns sat.
• Flow Isolation: Flow isolation is verified by adding
an additional assertion to Node Isolation: the additional
assertion states that b has never before sent a packet to a.
• Data Isolation: We rely on a pseudo-field on our
packet to indicate what machine data originated on. Mod-
els for caching firewalls are expected to preserve this field.
Given this pseudo-field we can check that a never ac-
cesses data from b by proving that there does not exist a
packet (p) such that p is received at a and has origin b.
• Node Traversal: The node traversal invariant re-
quires that all traffic from host a to host b pass through
some middlebox m. This can be proved by showing that if
m neither nor receives any packets then a and b are (node)
isolated from each other.
We can also use Node Isolation with an additional
constraint to measure the number of host pairs which can
potentially use a link (path in our case), we call this link
traversal. To measure link traversal we run 2× (n2) node
isolation checks with the added constraint that the packet
must have gone over the link. We then return the number
of cases in which Z3 returns sat for this check.
3.5 Enforcement
Our models are not automatically derived from imple-
mentations and hence it is possible (due to bugs) that the
implementation for a middlebox deviates from its model.
We address this by providing a runtime mechanism for
detecting instances where the implementation’s behavior
deviates from what is allowed by the model, we call this
process enforcement.
Since our models are specified as simple Python pro-
grams (§3.1) they can be executed as long as we generate
6
snd(e)∧ s(e) = f =⇒ t(cause(e))< t(e)
∧ rcv(cause(e))
∧d(cause(e)) = f
∧ p(cause(e)) = p(e)
∧acl(s(e1),d(e1))
rcv(e)∨ s(e) 6= f =⇒ cause(e) = e
Figure 3: EPR-F formulas equivalent to
send( f ,n, p, t)⇒ (∃t ′,n′.recv(n′, f , p, t ′)∧ t ′ < t ∧acl(s(p),d(p)).
an implementation for uninterpreted functions. Since, un-
interpreted function have finite codomains, we provide a
simple implementation where we execute the model once
for each value in an uninterpreted function’s codomain.
Given this implementation our enforcement strategy is
simple: when a packet is received at a middlebox, we send
a copy of the packet to the enforcement code, which gener-
ates all possible outputs that are allowed by the model. We
then compare the middlebox’s output to these possibilities
and report a deviation when no match is found.
4 Theoretical Analysis and Decidability
Next we try and answer two questions about our formula-
tion: are our formulas decidable (§4.1) i.e., can Z3 solver
find a satisfiable assignment (or prove that the formulas
are unsatisfiable) in a finite number of steps, and secondly
conditions under which combination of middleboxes will
result in RONO pipelines (§4.2).
4.1 Decidability
In general, first order logic is undecidable. However we
show that when we restrict our models (§3.1) and topol-
ogy (§3.2) as described previously, we get formulas that
lie in a decidable fragment of first-order logic. This frag-
ment is a simple extension of “effectively propositional
logic” (EPR). EPR is one of the fundamental decidable
fragments of first-order logic [28]. An EPR formula is a
set of function symbol free ∃∗∀∗ premises (assertions) and
a function symbol free ∀∗∃∗ formula as a consequence
(whose negation is added as an assertion before checking
for satisfiability). Z3 and other SMT solvers use algo-
rithms that are guaranteed to terminate for this fragment.
In our case, the formulas obtained from modeling mid-
dleboxes (e.g., Figure 1) as well as one of the network
axioms (assertion 3 in Figure 2) are ∀∗∃∗ premises and
hence not in EPR. Such premises may result in the for-
mula being undecidable (which would cause the SMT
solver to timeout). Therefore our case requires a more
expressive logic that we call EPR-F. EPR-F extends EPR
to allow restricted unary functions. To ensure that the
formulas are decidable, EPR-F requires that unary func-
tions have certain closure properties such that some finite
composition (including composition of the function with
Hosts Firewall Content Cache
500 43.87s 282.94s
1000 384.15s 4264.16s
1500 1736.70s 19819.72s
Table 1: Time to verify invariants in larger networks.
itself) must result in an idempotent function, e.g., for a
EPR-F formula with a single function f there must exist
k such that f k(x) = f k−1(x). Note that “non-cyclic” func-
tion symbols that go from one type to another7 can be
employed freely [22]. A fragment similar to EPR-F was
employed in [15], which also shows that EPR-F formulas
can be reduced to pure EPR.
One can translate our models (e.g., Figure 1) to EPR-F
using the following steps and then use the fact that our
topology and middleboxes are loop-free to prove that all
introduced functions are idempotent:
1. Reformulate our assertions with “event variables”
and functions that assign properties like time, source and
destination to an event. We use predicate function to mark
events as either being sends or receives.
2. Replace ∀∃ formulas with equivalent formulas that
contain Skolem functions instead of symbols.
For example the formula ∀n,n′, p, t .recv(n,n′, p, t) =⇒
∃t ′ .send(n,n′, p, t ′) ∧ t ′ < t is translated to the equiv-
alent formula ∀e .rcv(e) =⇒ snd(cause(e)) ∧ . . . ∧
t(cause(e)) < t(e) and we add a second assertion
∀e .snd(e) =⇒ cause(e) = e to ensure that cause(e) is
idempotent for send events. Figure 3 shows another exam-
ple of this reformulation for a simple ACL firewall (with
no learning action).
Finally, we need to show that these newly introduced
formulas have the desired closure properties. Note first
that each cause functions is idempotent: they are the iden-
tity function for either send or receive events and when
not the identity function cause links a send to a receive.
Furthermore, when applied to an event e the value of this
function (when not idempotent) is always another event
such that d(e) = s(e). Since we assume that we have loop
free forwarding this must terminate in a finite number
of steps (when we would have reached the edge of the
network) and therefore the newly introduced functions
meets the requirement for being in EPR-F.
4.2 RONO Pipelines
In this section we look at conditions under which network
pipelines are RONO. To start with define composition
of two middleboxes (or pipelines, which have the same
form) {m1,m2} to be the single middlebox representing
the case where all outputs from m1 are sent to m2. More
formally we define the composition function C as:
C(m1,m2)(p,S) =
{
m2(p′,S) | p′ ∈ m1(p,S)
}
where S is the combination of both m1 and m2’s histories.
7Assuming no function go back.
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Figure 4: (a) Topology for an enterprise network: f is a whole punching firewall, ek , hk and qk are different classes of hosts; (b) average verification
time per pipeline; (c) breakdown of pipeline verification time per invariant type.
As described previously, we say that a pipeline Π is
RONO if and only if
∀Sn∃S′ ⊇ Sn| f low(h) s.t. Π(h,S′| f low(h)) =Π(h,Sn)
i.e., a single middlebox equivalent to the composition
of all the middleboxes (and routers and switches) in a
pipeline is flow parallel. In this section we analyze cases
when pipelines are RONO and cases where pipelines are
not. Note, our analysis here is conservative, i.e., we find
sufficient conditions for pipelines to be RONO and it is
possible that other pipelines are also RONO.
For the statements below we focus on the composition
of flow parallel middleboxes. While one can in theory
construct RONO pipelines out of middleboxes that are not
flow parallel, the precise conditions for doing so depend
on the behavior of the middleboxes in question and are
hard to generalize.
All pipelines containing a single flow-parallel mid-
dlebox are RONO: this follows trivially from the defini-
tion of flow-parallel middleboxes and RONO pipelines.
Based on the previous result we state all subsequent
results in terms of RONO pipelines.
Not all compositions of RONO pipelines are RONO:
We show this by presenting a simple counter-example.
Consider the middlebox m(p,S) = {c} where c ∈ P is a
packet with source ipm, destination ip′m, source port sm
and destination port dm, i.e., m outputs a constant packet
c for any input. Since the definition of m is independent
of S we have ∀S ∈ H∗. m(h,S| f low(h)) = m(p,S) and m is
trivially flow parallel. Now consider the composition of
m with a RONO pipeline Π. Since m outputs the same
packet c regardless of the received packet, for Π flows
are indistinguishable and hence it cannot partition the his-
tory of received packet. C(m,Π) is therefore not RONO
despite both m and Π being RONO.
We say a RONO pipeline Π is flow preserving if and
only if:
∀S,h,h′ : f low(Π(h,S)) = f low(Π(h′,S)) ⇐⇒
f low(h) = f low(h′)
that is Π’s action maps headers for packets belonging to
the same flow to packets in the same flow (i.e., a flow-
preserving pipeline Π is injective with respect to flows).
The composition of two flow preserving pipelines is
also flow preserving – the composition of two injective
functions is injective.
The composition of flow-preserving RONO
pipelines is RONO: This is obvious to see: the previous
problem is a result of flows being merged, this is
impossible given flow-preserving middleboxes.
We thus see that any pipeline of flow-preserving, flow-
parallel middleboxes is RONO.
5 Evaluation
We now evaluate our system’s performance and demon-
strate gains when compared to an alternative that model-
checks the entire network (dubbed “naı¨ve approach”).
First, we show that our system can be used to verify exist-
ing networks in reasonable time. We evaluate our system’s
performance and scalability both on enterprise and depart-
mental networks that use stateful firewalls (§5.1) and on
provider networks that use content caches (§5.2). Next,
we evaluate our system’s performance on more general
functionality and show that it can be used to check invari-
ants in the presence of other kinds of middleboxes (§5.3).
Next, we evaluate the benefits of RONO (§5.4). We close
by evaluating our system’s performance when verifying
node-traversal invariants (§5.5).
5.1 Stateful Firewalls
Single FP Middlebox. We first consider the topology in
Figure 4(a), where one stateful firewall8 protects a net-
work that consists of three groups of hosts: Quarantined,
Normal, and External-facing. This arrangement is typical
of small and medium-size enterprises and several depart-
mental networks (including the network at UC Berkeley).
We use our system to verify the following node-isolation
and flow-isolation invariants:
1. Quarantined hosts are node-isolated: No quaran-
tined host can send or receive packets from the external
network.
2. External-facing servers can both access and be ac-
cessed from the external network.
8They may be several redundant physical firewall devices for fault
tolerance, but a single firewall processes all traffic between the internal
and external network.
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Figure 5: (a) Topology for pipeline-length scal-
ing; (b) topology for policy-size scaling
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Figure 6: Average pipeline verification time
with increasing pipeline length.
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Figure 7: Pipeline verification time with in-
creasing policy size.
3. Normal hosts are flow-isolated: Any normal host is
allowed to establish connections and communicate with
nodes in the external network, but the external network
cannot establish a connection with the host.
To implement these invariants, we configure the fire-
wall with two rules denying access (in either direction)
for each quarantined host, plus one rule denying inbound
connections for each normal host. For our evaluation, we
consider a network with equal numbers of hosts of each
group (i.e., a third of the hosts are quarantined and a third
are externally accessible). We configure our firewall cor-
rectly, and our results are for the case where all invariants
hold. Note, however, that misconfiguring the firewall so
that an invariant does not hold for a particular host merely
places that host in a different group. For instance, suppose
the firewall is misconfigured causing a particular quar-
antined host not to be isolated; from the point of view
of verification complexity, this is similar to the situation
where the host is a normal or external-facing host, and the
firewall is correctly configured. Thus, our evaluation pro-
vides relevant timing information for both the case where
an invariant holds and the cases where it is violated.
To start with, we measure the time taken to verify that
the correct invariants hold for all the hosts in the network.
Learning firewalls are flow-parallel, hence each pipeline
that involves a host and the firewall is RONO and can
be checked in isolation. Figure 4(b) shows pipeline ver-
ification time when we check each pipeline in isolation
(“Ours”) and when we check the entire network (“Naı¨ve”):
for a moderately sized network with a 100 hosts, our sys-
tem takes about 1sec per pipeline; hence, in the worst-case
scenario where it runs on a single core, it checks all 100
pipelines in about 100 seconds, which is two orders of
magnitude faster than the naı¨ve approach. Table 1 shows
pipeline verification time for our system, when we have
larger numbers of hosts: for a network of 1500 hosts,
it is close to half an hour; the naı¨ve approach does not
terminate in useful time.
Even for our system, pipeline verification time in-
creases with the number of hosts in the network, because
the number of hosts affects the number of rules that are
installed in the firewall, and these rules must be checked
for each pipeline. Figure 4(c) breaks down pipeline verifi-
cation time per invariant, and we see that verifying node-
isolation takes less time than verifying flow-isolation or
reachability. This is because node-isolation is expressed
as unsatisfiability, and Z3 has a known pathology where,
for many problems, proving unsatisfiability is faster than
finding a satisfiable assignment. While this is a known
problem, the exact reason is not understood. Other solvers,
for instance CVCLite, do not suffer from this limitation
but have other idiosyncrasies.
Increasing Pipeline Length. In reality, hosts in Fig-
ure 4(a) connect to the firewall through a series of
switches, routers, and perhaps other middleboxes that
we have elided. Next, we look at two questions: (i) what
is the cost of explicitly modeling switches/routers and
(ii) how does verification scale with increasing pipeline
length. We analyze both of these by changing the pipeline
in Figure 4(a) by introducing a series of routers (or mid-
dleboxes that forward all received packets) as shown in
Figure 5(a).
Figure 6 shows pipeline verification time for pipelines
of increasing length. We find that it grows rapidly with in-
creasing pipeline length, both for our system and the naı¨ve
approach. Even so, our system is two orders of magnitude
faster. Fortunately, due to the additional latency added by
each middlebox, we expect the number of middleboxes
in a pipeline to be relatively small. Further, given that
we require the forwarding configuration of switches and
routers in the network under analysis to contain no black
holes, we can usually elide switches and routers while
verifying our supported set of invariants.
Scalability microbenchmark. Our system outper-
forms the alternative because it models the network as a
set of parallel pipelines and checks each pipeline in isola-
tion; but even for a single pipeline, policy size grows as a
function of the network size: for instance in our enterprise
network example, the firewall has O(n) ACL rules where
n is the number of hosts. Next, we consider the impact
of policy size on verification time. We study this in the
topology in Figure 5(b), where two hosts, each with n IP
addresses, are separated by a firewall with O(n2) ACLs.
We consider two invariants:
1. Isolation: the two hosts can never communicate. For
this, we install n2 DENY exact-match rules in the firewall,
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Figure 8: (a) A content provider network with a content cache; (b) average pipeline verification time to check that hosts can access s1 content; (c)
average pipeline verification time to check that hosts cannot access s2 content.
corresponding to all pairs of the hosts’ addresses.
2. Reachability: the two hosts can always communi-
cate. For this, we install n2−1 exact-match DENY rules
in the firewall, blocking communication between all pairs
of the hosts’ addresses but one.
We measure how verification time increases with the num-
ber of firewall rules. Figure 7 shows the results. Note that
while verification time does not grow rapidly, larger pol-
icy sizes result in larger models that need more memory
to be expressed. At large enough sizes verification does
not succeed because of memory pressure.
5.2 Content Caches
Next, we consider the topology in Figure 8(a), where a
set of hosts access a set of content servers placed behind
a content cache and a firewall. This setup is representa-
tive of content-provider networks, which employ content
caches to improve the performance of user-facing services
and reduce server load, but may place restrictions on what
hosts can access a particular class of content.
A content cache typically implements an ACL to pre-
vent clients from using caching to bypass policy: Con-
sider Figure 8(a) and suppose that each of the two content
servers provides content to different clients. For example,
when client a requests “http://xxx.com/latest-news,” the
request is served by s1; when client b requests the same
name, the request is served by s2. So, a request for the
same name results in different content, depending on who
is asking (a typical practice by content providers). To im-
plement this policy, the provider configures the firewall to
prevent communication between a and s2. However, every
time b accesses content from s2, that content gets cached
in the content cache and becomes available to a—unless
the cache implements an ACL specifying that a must not
access content that originated in s2.
We use our system to verify two data-isolation invari-
ants:
1. Hosts h2 . . .hn can never access any content that
originated in server s2.
2. Hosts h1 . . .hn can always access any content that
originated in server s1.
To implement these invariants, we configure the content
cache with an exact-match rule denying access (to data
that originated from server s2) for each of hosts h2 . . .hn.
To make verification more challenging, we also configure
the firewall with two exact-match rules denying access
(to and from s2) for each of these hosts. As above, we
configure the middleboxes correctly, and our results are
for the case where all invariants hold, but verification
complexity is similar when the invariants are violated.
We measure the time taken to verify that the correct
invariants hold for all hosts in the network. The con-
tent cache is flow-parallel: any content requests made
by host hi do not affect the behavior of the content cache
toward requests made by host h j. The firewall is also
flow-parallel and flow-preserving. Hence, a pipeline con-
sisting of the content cache, the firewall and two end-hosts
is RONO and can be checked in isolation. Figures 8(b)
and 8(c) show pipeline verification time when we verify
each pipeline in isolation (“Ours”) and when we verify
the entire network (“Naı¨ve”): in the case of 100 accessing
hosts, our system takes about 12 minutes per pipeline,
more than an order of magnitude faster than the naı¨ve
approach. Table 1 shows pipeline verification time for our
system, when we have larger numbers of hosts: for a net-
work of 1000 hosts, it is a little above an hour; the naı¨ve
approach does not terminate in useful time. Consistently
with the results presented in Section 5.1, verifying that
certain hosts cannot access certain content (Figure 8(c))
is significantly faster than verifying that certain hosts can
access certain content (Figure 8(b)).
5.3 Generic Middleboxes
So far we have considered two existing, commonly used
middleboxes; now we provide evidence that our system
can handle other types of stateful middleboxes.
We consider the topology in Figure 9(a), where source
a is connected to destination b through a “permutation
middlebox” p0 and a firewall f that drops traffic between
specific address pairs. Each of hosts a and b has multiple
addresses; we denote a’s addresses by ai and b’s addresses
by b j. When a sends a packet to b, p0 replaces the packet’s
source and destination addresses with a different pair;
how it chooses the new address pair depends on previ-
ously observed traffic from a to b. For example, the box’s
configuration may dictate that: after observing a packet
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Figure 9: (a) Topology for evaluating generic middleboxes; (b) time to verify node-isolation between a pair of hosts in the topology from Figure 9(a).
with source address a1 and destination address b1, in any
future packet, source address a1 will be replaced with
a2, and destination address b1 will be replaced with b2.
Similarly, each permutation box pi permutes the source
and destination addresses of packets from host ei to host b
based on previously observed traffic between these hosts.
This setup is contrived, but it captures the complexity
of any situation where a middlebox changes incoming
packets based on traffic history. In our particular setup,
the middlebox permutes the source and destination ad-
dresses of incoming packets, and its choice of new ad-
dresses determines whether the firewall will drop each
resulting packet or not (potentially causing the violation
of an isolation invariant). In a different setup, the middle-
box might change some other part of incoming packets,
and its choice would determine whether a downstream in-
trusion detection system would drop each resulting packet
or not.
We use our system to verify the following node-
isolation invariant: host a can never send traffic to host
b. To implement this, we configure the firewall f to drop
all packets with a/b address pairs. The permutation box
p0 is flow-parallel: its behavior with respect to a/b traffic
depends only on previously observed a/b traffic, which
allows us to check the a–p0– f –b pipeline in isolation. Fig-
ure 9(b) shows pipeline verification time as a function of
the number of hosts (or permutation boxes, since we have
one per host) in the network (consider only the “Ours”
and “Naı¨ve” curves, for the moment). Our system takes a
few tens of milliseconds per pipeline, independently from
the number of nodes in the network; this is not the case
for the naı¨ve approach, which already takes two orders
of magnitude longer for 20 hosts. Our system’s pipeline
verification time remains nearly constant with the number
of hosts (and permutation boxes), because, in this particu-
lar setup, increasing the number of hosts does not affect
the configuration size of p0 or f (the number of rules
installed in the firewall depends on the number of a/b ad-
dress pairs). We do see a slight increase due to the fact that
we allocate increasingly larger numbers of addresses and
hosts. In a extreme test we found that even with 30,000
hosts and middleboxes our system could construct and
verify the model in less than 5 minutes.
5.4 The Benefit of RONO
So far we have considered only flow-parallel middleboxes,
which our system was designed to handle efficiently; we
now describe a scenario with non-flow-parallel middle-
boxes, where our system is as good as the naı¨ve approach.
We consider again the topology in Figure 9(a) and the
same node-isolation invariant as above (host a can never
send traffic to host b), and we configure the firewall to
drop all packets with a/b address pairs. However, we make
the permutation middleboxes non-flow-parallel: p0 deter-
mines how to permute a/b addresses based on previously
observed traffic, not only from a to b, but from any host ei
to b. As a result, p0’s behavior with respect to a/b traffic
depends on traffic previously carried by other pipelines,
and we cannot check the a–p0– f –b pipeline in isolation.
The “Non-FP” curve in Figure 9(b) shows pipeline ver-
ification time as a function of the number hosts in the
network.
The three curves in Figure 9(b) together show the ben-
efit of RONO: when middleboxes are flow-parallel, our
system leverages RONO and completes verification in
tens of milliseconds (“Ours”); with the naı¨ve approach
(“Naı¨ve”), verification takes as long as if the middleboxes
were not flow-parallel (“Non-FP”).
5.5 Node Traversal
We consider the topology in Figure 10(a), where a, b, c
and d are middleboxes that always forward all received
packets: the forwarding tables are set up such that all
traffic sent by any host (e0 . . .en) is first sent to a, which
depending on the destination forwards this traffic to either
c or d; finally, both c and d forward packets to b, which
delivers them to the intended host. Note that checking
node traversal requires considering the entire network
(so RONO does not help us here). We use our system to
verify a node-traversal invariant: that traffic from host ei
to host e j always traverses middlebox c, for a given set of
{i, j} pairs. We configure the middleboxes such that the
invariant holds for half the host pairs and not for the other
half. Figure 10(b) shows the average time to check this
property for each host pair (averaged across the set of all
considered host pairs).
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Figure 10: (a) Topology for evaluating node-traversal invariant; (b) verification time for node-traversal invariant.
6 Related Work
The earliest use of formal verification in networking fo-
cused on proving correctness and checking security prop-
erties for protocols [6, 30]. The first application of these
techniques to control and data plane verification looked
at verifying BGP configuration [11, 12] in WANs.
Verifying Forwarding Rules Recent efforts in network
verification [1,4,19,20,25,32,34] have focused on verify-
ing the network dataplane by analyzing forwarding tables.
Some of these tools including HSA [18], Libra [38] and
VeriFlow [20] have also developed algorithms to perform
near real-time verification of simple properties such as
loop-freedom and the absence of blackholes. While well
suited for checking networks with static data planes they
are insufficient for dynamic datapaths.
Verifying Network Updates Another line of network
verification research has focused on verification during
configuration updates. This line of work can be used to
verify the consistency of routing tables generated by SDN
controllers [16, 36]. Recent efforts [24] have generalized
these mechanisms and can be used to determine what
parts of the configuration are affected by an update, and
verify invariants on this subset of the configuration. This
line of work has been restricted to analyzing policy up-
dates performed by the control plane and does not address
dynamic data plane elements where state updates are more
frequent and span a wider range.
Verifying Network Applications Other work has looked
at verifying the correctness of control and data plane appli-
cations. NICE [4] proposed using static analysis to verify
the correctness of controller programs. Later extensions
including [23] have looked at improving the accuracy
of NICE using concolic testing [31] at the cost of com-
pleteness. More recently, Vericon [2] has looked at sound
verification of a restricted class of controllers.
Recent work [8] has also looked at using symbolic
execution to prove properties for programmable datapaths
(middleboxes). This work in particular looked at verifying
bounded execution, crash freedom and that certain packets
are filtered for stateless or simple stateful middleboxes
written as pipelines and meeting certain criterion. The
verification technique does not scale to middleboxes like
content caches which maintain arbitrary state.
Finite State Model Checking Finite state model check-
ing has been applied to check the correctness of many
hardware and software based systems [5]. Here the be-
havior of a system is specified as a transition relation
between finite state and a checker can verify that all reach-
able states from a starting configuration are safe (i.e., do
not cause any invariant violation). Tools such as NICE [4],
HSA [19] and others [35] rely on this technique. However
these techniques scale exponentially with the number of
states and for even moderately large problems one must
chose between being able to verify in reasonable time and
completeness. Our use of SMT solvers allows us to reason
about potentially infinite state and our choice of formulas
are expressible in a way that guarantees termination of
the SMT solver (§4.1).
Language Abstractions Several recent works in
software-defined networking [13, 14, 21, 27, 37] have pro-
posed the use of verification friendly languages for con-
trollers. One could similarly extend this concept to pro-
vide a verification friendly data plane language however
our approach is orthogonal to such a development: we aim
at proving network wide properties rather than properties
for individual middleboxes.
Finally, parallel to our work Fayaz, et al. [10] use mid-
dlebox models to generate test packets to check network
invariants. Similar to us, they model middleboxes as state
machines, however our models are expressed differently
and they aim to test rather than verify networks.
7 Conclusion
On the one hand our work can be seen as merely a tech-
nical demonstration that one can verify isolation environ-
ments in large networks. However, our ambition is larger
than merely providing operators with another verification
tool. We hope that armed with the ability to verify both
the static-datapath and dynamic-datapath aspects of a net-
work, operators demand abstract middlebox models from
their vendors. This would (a) allow operators to enforce
these aspects of the middleboxes, so that middlebox viola-
tions of prescribed behavior can be detected and (b) allow
operators to verify that their overall network meets their
desired invariants. This would move networking from its
current ad hoc practice to a more desirable state where in-
variants are explicitly expressed and rigorously enforced.
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